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I know the Wall Street crowd can’t wait to sink their teeth into a 
new trillion-dollar trading market in which hedge funds and 
investment banks would trade and speculate on carbon credits and 
securities.  In no time they’ll create derivatives, swaps and more in 
that new market.  In fact, most of the investment banks have already 
created carbon trading departments.  They are ready to go.  I’m 
not. 
Senator Byron Dorgan (D-North Dakota)1 
People are going to be cutting up carbon futures, and we’ll be in 
trouble. . . . You can’t stay ahead of the next tool they’re going to 
create. . . . The derivatives market has done so much damage to our 
economy and is nothing more than a very-high-stakes casino—
except that casinos have to abide by regulations.  
Senator Maria Cantwell (D-Washington)2 
You’re essentially setting up a brand-new currency here. . . . The 
American public is more than just a little suspicious about what 
goes on in the trading world.  It’s not clear and not transparent, 
and nothing I’ve seen allows it to be so.  There’s a deep suspicion 
about setting up such a regime.  











 1.  Byron Dorgan, Reduce Our CO2, Yes . . . But Cap-and-Trade, No, BISMARK TRIB., July 19, 
2009, http://www.bismarcktribune.com/news/opinion/mailbag/article_c337fb0c-434a-51a4-ae35-d5 
7bb0357997.html. 
 2.  Lisa Kassenaar, Carbon Capitalists Warming to Climate Market Using Derivatives, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 4, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive& 
sid=aXRBOxU5KT5M (quoting Senator Maria Cantwell, D-Washington). 
 3.  Joel Kirkland, Senators Call for Financial Reform Before Cap and Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
5, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/11/05/05climatewire-senators-call-for-financial- 
reform-before-ca-93661.html (quoting Senator Lisa Murkowski, R-Alaska). 
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The system can be gamed; that’s why financial types like me like 
it—because there are financial opportunities. 
George Soros4 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
There are many reasons that comprehensive United States climate 
change legislation has moved more slowly than anticipated just a few years 
ago.5  But surely the most important has to be the impact and aftermath of 
the global financial crisis of 2008 and 2009.  The economic effects of the 
crisis have reverberated in the political sphere, where many analysts suggest 
that given the weak job and economic situation, now is not the time to 
introduce the “expense” of climate change legislation.6  Related to this is the 
choice that was made to pursue major health care reform, whose political 
future may also be tied to the weak economy.7  The combination of these 
events has been a potent drag on movement in climate change, especially in 
the U.S. Senate.  As stated by Senator Byron Dorgan, D-North Dakota: 
My own sense is that in the aftermath of a very, very heavy lift on 
health care, I think it is unlikely that the Senate will turn next to the 
very complicated and very controversial subject of cap-and-trade,8 
climate change kind of legislation. . . .  I think it is more compelling 
to turn to an energy bill that is bi-partisan.9 
 
 4.  Katherine Burton & Jim Efstathiou, Jr., Soros to Invest $1 Billion in Clean Energy, Form 
Advisory Group, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 11, 2009, 7:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news? 
pid=newsarchive&sid=aehNEmSWfjiQ (quoting George Soros). 
 5.  Victor B. Flatt, Taking the Legislative Temperature: Which Federal Climate Change 
Legislative Proposal Is “Best”?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 123, 123 (2007) (“The United 
States will almost certainly enact federal legislation designed to reduce emissions of greenhouse 
gases within the next two years.”). 
 6.  Darren Samuelsohn, Economic Crisis Rattles Cap-and-Trade Debate, EARTH NEWS (Sept. 
29, 2008), http://www.earthportal.org/news/?p=1744. 
 7.  Michael Cooper, G.O.P. Senate Victory Stuns Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/20/us/politics/20election.html.  But see Stephanie Cutter, 
Repealing the Affordable Care Act Will Hurt the Economy, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Jan. 7, 2011, 1:36 
PM), http://m.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/01/07/repealing-affordable-care-act-will-hurt-economy. 
 8.  See Cap and Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2010, http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/ 
timestopics/subjects/g/greenhouse_gas_emissions/cap_and_trade/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier 
(explaining the “cap-and-trade” regulatory system). 
 9.  Tom Doggett, Senate Not Seen Passing Climate Bill in 2010, REUTERS (Jan. 19, 2010, 4:22 
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60I3NA20100119. 
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But the impact of the economic crisis on comprehensive climate change 
legislation is not just because of the perceived costs of such measures in a 
weakened economy, but also the fear that a comprehensive cap-and-trade 
carbon market could produce exotic financial instruments that would lead to 
a similar crisis in the future.  As evidenced by some of the quotes above, this 
concern was particularly acute in the United States Senate, where the ability 
to garner the sixty votes necessary to move on climate change legislation 
may be derailed by just a few senators suspicious of an emerging U.S. 
“carbon” market. 
Even if a comprehensive U.S. climate bill is not forthcoming, 
California’s emerging economy-wide climate regulation, the Global 
Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB 32), despite a recent setback,10 is likely 
to depend on a comprehensive cap-and-trade scheme.11  This system, if 
linked with other carbon trading systems in North America as anticipated, 
will cover over one-third of the North American economy.12  Moreover, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began regulating greenhouse gases 
under the Clean Air Act (CAA) in January 2010,13 and though EPA 
Administrator Lisa Jackson has said that the EPA has no plans to create a 
cap-and-trade system to deal with greenhouse gases, the possibility of the 
EPA using such a system remains.14  Several analysts have found legal 
authority for such a system.15  The newly elected Republican majority in the 
 
 10.  A California Superior Court Judge recently suspended the implementation of AB 32’s cap-
and-trade provisions, holding that the California Air Resources Board failed to adequately consider 
other options.  Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., No. CPF-09-509562, Order Granting 
in Part Petition For Writ of Mandate, filed Mar. 18, 2011, available at http://cdn.law.ucla.edu/ 
SiteCollectionDocuments/Environmental%20Law/Court%27s%20Final%20Order%203%2017%201
1.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2011); see also Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE §§ 38500–38599 (West 2010) [hereinafter AB 32]. 
 11.  See Colin Sullivan, Calif. Regulators Scramble in Wake of Court Ruling on Climate Law, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/03/24/24greenwire-calif-
regulators-scramble-in-wake-of-court-rul-93103.html?pagewanted=all; see also Cap-and-Trade 
Program, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY AIR RES. BD., available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ 
capandtrade/capandtrade.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2011). 
 12.  Simon Lomax, Cap-and-Trade Market for North America Weighed by States After Obama 
Fails, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 29, 2010, 9:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-30/cap-
and-trade-market-for-north-america-weighed-by-states-after-obama-fails.html; see also Nathanial 
Gronewald, Traders and Experts Say Regional Cap-and-Trade Systems will Proliferate, 
CLIMATEWIRE (June 16, 2011), http://www.rggi.org/docs/Climatewire_June_16.pdf. 
 13.  Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66496 (effective Jan. 14, 2010). 
 14.  Simon Lomax, EPA Studying Own Carbon Trading System, Official Says (Update2), 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 15, 2010, 5:38 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive& 
sid=ammjHfzRpc9I. 
 15.  See generally Hannah Chang, Cap-and-Trade Under the Clean Air Act?: Rethinking Section 
115 (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Climate Change Law, Working Paper, Apr. 2010), available at 
http://www.law.columbia.edu/null/download?&exclusive=filemgr.download&file_id=155078 
(describing the legality of a potential EPA attempt to institute a cap-and-trade program for 
Greenhouse Gases under Section 115 of the CAA); see also Jonas Monast et al., Avoiding the 
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House of Representatives may attempt to limit the EPA’s authority to 
regulate greenhouse gases under the CAA,16 but given the Democratic 
majority in the Senate and a likely presidential veto, these attempts would 
likely amount to nothing more than grandstanding. 
Due to the EPA’s possible implementation of a cap-and-trade scheme, 
the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the Northeast United States, and 
California’s coming implementation, cap-and-trade will in all likelihood be a 
fixture of greenhouse gas regulation in the United States for the foreseeable 
future.  Any programs instituted by the EPA, California, and other North 
American entities will likely be watched closely for their effect on the 
market.  Their successes and failures, along with their perceived risks, could 
play a large role in determining whether or not the United States will ever 
adopt mandatory nationwide carbon emissions limitations through a 
comprehensive climate change bill.  Given the importance of the role that 
markets might play in large domestic regional systems or a CAA regulatory 
environment, the fear of a carbon market as a financial Trojan horse must be 
carefully analyzed to determine what risks might lurk in a carbon market in 
the large United States market. 
Analyzing the issues at this stage serves two important goals.  If 
comprehensive climate change legislation is eventually passed, it is 
important that the legislation be tailored to address those risks; and even if 
Congress fails to pass a comprehensive bill, it could still intervene in a 
piecemeal fashion to insure that an EPA imposed cap-and-trade scheme does 
not pose undue risks to the financial markets.  Moreover, if emerging 
systems do not work properly or fail outright, they could delay or suspend 
greenhouse gas regulation on a domestic level, and possibly limit any 
potential worldwide agreement on greenhouse gas reductions. 
While carbon markets in this country do create a certain amount of 
market risk, this Article posits that risk can be lessened by careful language 
in a cap-and-trade bill or an agency regulation, particularly language 
governing greenhouse gas offsets—which, as discussed in Parts III and IV,17 
could create the most significant risk in the financial markets.  However, this 
Article is not designed to lobby for a cap-and-trade system; it is designed to 
 
Glorious Mess: A Sensible Approach to Climate Change and the Clean Air Act (Duke Univ. 
Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Policy Solutions, Working Paper, Oct. 2010), available at 
http://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/climate/policydesign/avoiding-the-glorious-mess. 
 16.  See Tennille Tracy, Upton Looks to Block Greenhouse Gas Rules, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 
2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704358704576118994154302516.html. 
 17.  See infra notes 79–101 and accompanying text. 
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produce information necessary to create the most efficient way of 
controlling greenhouse gases. 
In addition to the fear of market disruptions and profiteering, there is an 
equal or perhaps more important concern that a greenhouse gas cap-and-
trade system will fail to control the environmental impacts as advertised 
precisely because of market control failures.  Reductions could certainly be 
illusory due to monitoring difficulties or outright fraud.18  This is a serious 
concern and any careful cap-and-trade system must address both concerns 
about the environmental efficacy of the system as well as the risks for 
market problems.  In fact, these issues are related.  Any system to control 
greenhouse gases should both do what it is designed to do—reduce 
greenhouse gases in the amount expected—and do it efficiently.  A cap-and-
trade system for its own sake, while perhaps welcome by commodity traders, 
would be environmentally counterproductive if there were a serious risk of 
failing to accomplish environmental goals.  Indeed, Michelle Chan, 
President of Friends of the Earth has propagated a list entitled “Ten Ways to 
Game the Carbon Market,” which is designed to discourage Congress from 
passing cap-and-trade legislation, or at least cap-and-trade legislation that 
contains offsets.19  Thus, any discussion of the probabilities and fears of 
market problems must also bear in mind the risk of environmental failure.  
Nevertheless, due to the fact that political forces seem fearful of economic 
impacts, this Article approaches cap-and-trade from the angle of minimizing 
both environmental and financial failures. 
Part I of this Article begins by discussing the history of the push for 
comprehensive climate legislation with particular emphasis on the 
preference for a cap-and-trade system.  Part II then briefly reviews the role 
that toxic assets played in the financial crisis, before analyzing the potential 
risks of such toxic assets infecting a greenhouse gas cap-and-trade system, 
particularly in the offset system.  Part III discusses the possibility of offset 
failure, which, as discussed in Part II, could give rise to market disruptions 
along two distinct axes: market failure and environmental failure.  Part IV 
proposes legislative and regulatory solutions that could lessen the risk 
inherent in these failures or that could cause it to be avoided entirely.  Part V 
concludes. 
 
 18.  See Flatt, supra note 5, at 138; Victor Flatt, Tackling the Issue of Fraud in Carbon Trading, 
FUELFIX (Feb. 10, 2010, 1:49 PM), http://fuelfix.com/blog/2010/02/10/tackling-the-issue-of-fraud-
in-carbon-trading/.  There is also the concern that even an effectively functioning greenhouse gas 
market will have other negative impacts on society or the environment.  See Victor Flatt, Kerry-
Lieberman Creates Some Added Certainty on Offsets, CPRBLOG (May 12, 2010), 
http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=8E818F19-A0D1-39EA-7299E012C45D 
6CBE. 
 19.  MICHELLE CHAN, TEN WAYS TO GAME THE CARBON MARKET (May 2010), available at 
http://www.probeinternational.org/files/10WaystoGametheCarbonMarkets_Web.pdf. 
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II.  BACKGROUND OF CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION                                          
IN THE UNITED STATES 
A serious push for comprehensive climate change legislation began even 
before the election of Barack Obama and increased congressional majorities 
for the Democrats in the United States House and Senate.20  The first 
comprehensive bill was proposed by Senators John McCain and Joe 
Lieberman in 2005.21  Activity at the state and local levels and business 
concerns over piecemeal legislation prompted more momentum for a 
comprehensive federal response.22 
After the Democratic election sweep in November 2008, momentum 
increased.23  In June 2009, the House passed comprehensive legislation, 
called the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 200924 (ACES), and 
the Senate moved a bill proposed by Senators John Kerry and Barbara Boxer 
(Kerry-Boxer) out of the Energy and Public Works Committee.25  In 2010, 
Senators Kerry, Lieberman, and Graham proposed adjusting the primary 
cap-and-trade proposals with incentives for nuclear energy and more 
offshore oil drilling,26 while Senators Cantwell and Collins proposed a 
redistribution of emission allocation proceeds to the general public (the so-
called cap-and-dividend approach).27  The former was derailed by Senate 
machinations (including political issues such as parallel immigration reform) 
 
 20.  Flatt, supra note 5, at 123. 
 21.  Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2005, S. 1151, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 22.  See, e.g., JOEL B. SMITH ET AL., ADAPTING TO CLIMATE CHANGE: A CALL FOR FEDERAL 
LEADERSHIP (Pew Center on Global Climate Change ed., Mar. 2010), available at 
http://pewclimate.org/docUploads/adaptation-federal-leadership.pdf. 
 23.  ANALYSIS: As Momentum from 2008 Election Fades, Senators Struggle to Salvage Climate 
Bill, US LAW WATCH (July 12, 2010), http://www.uslawwatch.com/2010/07/12/environment/ 
analysis-momentum-2008-election-fades-senators-struggle-salvage-climate-bill. 
 24.  H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 25.  Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2009).  The bill was 
also co-sponsored by Senators Benjamin Cardin (D-Md.) and Paul Kirk (D-Ma.).  See id.  For an 
analysis of these legislative developments, see Jonas Monast, Climate Change and Financial 
Markets: Regulating the Trade Side of Cap and Trade, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10051 




 26.  American Power Act, Discussion Draft, 111th Cong. (2010), available at 
http://kerry.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/APAbill3.pdf. 
 27.  Consolidated Land, Energy, and Aquatic Resources Act of 2010, H.R. 3534, 111th Cong. 
(2010). 
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and the Deepwater Horizon oil well platform blowout;28 while the latter 
failed to gain expected traction.29 
The EPA has moved in parallel to regulate greenhouse gases under 
provisions of the Clean Air Act, finding that greenhouse gases endanger the 
public health and welfare on December 7, 2009.30  Although the EPA, states, 
and regions appear ready to move forward with some kind of regulation, 
prospects for comprehensive federal legislation seem murky.31 
While the private sector seems to be moving forward with the idea that 
some kind of regulation is inevitable,32 the slowdown in the Senate has had 
consequences.  For example, in the lead-up to the Copenhagen Conference 
of the Parties in December 2009, the Senate’s inability to pass 
comprehensive climate change legislation caused international attitudes 
towards the United States to sour, which may have caused the United States 
to lose leverage in pushing other nations towards binding greenhouse gas 
reduction targets.33  Additionally, Congress’s inaction has led to frustration 
in the private sector, as business leaders complain that they must know how 
and when climate change legislation will progress before they can move 
forward with future plans.34 
 
 28.  See, e.g., Kerry, Lieberman Willing To Scale Back Energy Bill To Get Republican Support, 
HUFFINGTON POST (June 29, 2010, 3:51 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/29/kerry-
lieberman-willing-t_n_629618.html; see also David O. Williams, Congress Narrowly Passes 
CLEAR Act as Salazar Joins GOP Opposition, COLO. INDEP. (July 30, 2010, 6:17 PM), 
http://coloradoindependent.com/58594/congress-narrowly-passes-clear-act-as-salazar-joins-gop-
opposition. 
 29.  See S. 2877: Carbon Limits and Energy for America’s Future Renewal (CLEAR) Act, 
GOVTRACK.US,  http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-2877 (last visited Oct. 3, 
2011).  The bill was introduced in December 2009 and has never made it out of committee.  See id. 
 30.  Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases under Section 
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ 
endangerment.html (last updated Nov. 9, 2011). 
 31.  See, e.g., Amy Harder, EPA Vote: Momentum Builder?, NATIONALJOURNAL, June 14, 2010, 
http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2010/06/epa-vote-momentum-builder.php; see also CAL. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY AIR RES. BD., http://www.arb.ca.gov/homepage.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2011). 
 32.  See Fortune 500s See Cost Savings From Carbon Management, 
SUSTAINABLEBUSINESS.COM (Jan. 26, 2011, 10:03 AM), http://www.sustainablebusiness.com/ 
index.cfm/go/news.display/id/21768. 
 33.  See Victor Flatt, Climate Change Confusion in US Infects Lead Up to Copenhagen, FUELFIX 
(Nov. 7, 2009, 7:33 PM), http://fuelfix.com/blog/2009/11/07/climate-change-confusion-in-us-
infects-lead-up-to-copenhagen/. 
 34.  See Danny Bradbury, Business Leaders Blast Congress for Cap-and-Trade Indecision, 
BUSINESSGREEN (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/1804808/business-leaders-
blast-congress-cap-trade-indecision.  Even without comprehensive federal regulation, many 
businesses and residents of the United States will see regulation in possible state or regional systems, 
as well as likely regulation under the Clean Air Act by the EPA. See supra notes 9–11 and 
accompanying text. 
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Aside from the possibility of piecemeal legislation primarily focused on 
energy investment and efficiency,35 the only real candidates for 
comprehensive federal climate change law remain economy wide cap-and-
trade bills.  These cap-and-trade preferences appear to run deep.36  
California’s AB 32 does not mandate a cap-and-trade bill, but this is what 
has been proposed in rulemaking.37  Additionally, the European Union (EU) 
has utilized a cap-and-trade approach, under the auspices of the Kyoto 
Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms as its primary greenhouse gas control 
vehicle.38  In the summer of 2010, China, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand 
all moved in the direction of a cap-and-trade system.39  The fact that cap-
and-trade systems already exist and have a long history is a powerful 
incentive for the United States to adopt one. 
The United States itself was the single most important factor in bringing 
about the possibility of cap-and-trade for greenhouse gases in the negotiation 
of the Kyoto Protocol’s flexible mechanisms, under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1997.40  Europe adopted this 
flexible approach under a multi-country system starting in 2005, and has 
revisited and expanded it since then.41 
In addition to the “first mover” push that existing systems give to cap-
and-trade, economics favors expansion of cap-and-trade rather than 
introduction of a new system.  Cap-and-trade systems are more efficient and 
 
 35.  See Steven Mufson, Vanishing Cap and Trade in Obama’s 2012 Budget, WASH. POST, Feb. 
14, 2011, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/post-carbon/2011/02/vanishing_cap_and_trade_in_ 
oba.html. 
 36.  Flatt, supra note 5, at 135 (“Interestingly all of the climate change legislative proposals 
would be considered market-based control regimes, with Bingaman-Specter, Udall-Petri, Lieberman-
McCain, Kerry-Snowe, Waxman, Feinstein-Carper, and Alexander-Lieberman, all envisioning a 
cap-and-trade scheme for CO2 . . . .”). 
 37.  Cap-and-Trade Program, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY AIR RES. BD. (Nov. 13, 2011), 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm. 
 38.  The Mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol: Emissions Trading, the Clean Development 
Mechanism and Joint Implementation, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/items/1673.php (last visited Dec. 12, 2011) 
[hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
 39.  See Robert Stavins, Opportunities and Ironies: Climate Policy in Tokyo, Seoul, Brussels, 
and Washington, AN ECON. VIEW ON THE ENV’T (Mar. 21, 2010), http://www.robertstavinsblog.org/ 
2010/03/21/opportunities-and-ironies-climate-policy-in-tokyo-seoul-brussels-and-washington/; 
China Studying Cap-And-Trade System to Help Cut Greenhouse Gas Emissions, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 
17, 2010, 8:44 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-18/china-studies-cap-and-trade-
system-to-spur-reduction-in-carbon-emissions.html. 
 40.  Michael Grubb, The Economics of the Kyoto Protocol, 4 WORLD ECON. 143, 143 (2003), 
available at http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/rstaff/grubb/publications/J36.pdf. 
 41.  UNFCCC, supra note 38.  Though its terms were set to expire in 2012, it was extended until 
2020 under an agreement reached at COP 16 in Durban, South Africa. 
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powerful if they become larger, and the EU has called for all Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development countries to become part of 
one market.42  In 2007, former Governor Schwarzenegger of California put 
forward an executive order requiring California’s eventual cap-and-trade 
system to integrate with the EU’s system.43  Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative officials have also expressed interest in integrating with the EU.44 
The established infrastructure for cap-and-trade schemes, both capital 
and knowledge intensive, has already grown up around the EU system and is 
a powerful voice and incentive for expanding and propagating cap-and-trade 
systems for greenhouse gas control.  The market alternative, coordinating 
equivalent tax systems between sovereigns, is more difficult (though not 
impossible) than simply allowing a worldwide clearinghouse price to arise in 
free trading.45  This is because a system in which individual sovereigns self-
impose a carbon tax could potentially cause problems for international trade, 
and any attempt to coordinate such systems could implicate complex issues 
under World Trade Organization rules.46  A unified cap-and-trade system, on 
the other hand, reaches the optimal market price through the operation of the 
market itself. 
Additionally, in evaluating a carbon tax versus a cap-and-trade system, 
cap-and-trade may offer the advantage of vested interests keeping the system 
robust, whereas a tax system is subject to ongoing lobbying by special 
interest groups which can weaken and distort the ultimate tax goals by 
carving out special market distorting exceptions.47  Moreover, even absent 
special interest groups, Professor Deborah Paul proposed that any tax system 
will become more complex over time as it tries to better achieve policy goals 
 
 42.  EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REFORMING INTERNATIONAL CARBON MARKET MECHANISMS, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/clima/events/0013/info_sheet_carbon_markets_final_en.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 12, 2011). 
 43.  Robin Lancaster, Schwarzenegger Under Fire on Emissions Trading Plans, 
ENVIRONMENTAL FINANCE (Nov. 1, 2006), http://www.environmental-finance.com/news/view/394. 
 44.  Joseph Kruger & William A. Pizer, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: Prelude to a 
National Program?, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, http://www.rff.org/News/Features/Pages/Regional-
Greenhouse-Gas-Initiative.aspx; INT’L CARBON ACTION P’SHIP, POLITICAL DECLARATION (Oct. 29, 
2007), available at http://www.gov.mb.ca/asset_library/en/premier/icap_declaration_oct2007.pdf. 
 45.  TIMOTHY E. DEAL, WTO RULES AND PROCEDURES AND THEIR IMPLICATION FOR THE 
KYOTO PROTOCOL 10–12 (United States Council for Int’l Bus. ed., Jan. 2008), available at 
http://www.uscib.org/docs/wto_and_kyoto_2008.pdf. 
 46.  See id. 
 47.  Adam S. Chodorow, Maaser Kesafim and the Development of Tax Law, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 
153, 207–08 (2007) (“It is likely that the same need for enforcement, legal structure, and cultural 
values that currently bear on our income tax will come to bear on any new tax system we devise.  
Thus, we can expect that enforcement concerns will cause the tax base definition to deviate from the 
ideal to create an administrable tax; Congress will likely graft provisions to promote social policy 
onto the tax system, thus complicating the code and people’s ability to comply; special interest 
legislation will likely arise, further complicating the laws; and society’s underlying values, such as 
horizontal equity, will likely affect the development of the law.”). 
DO NOT DELETE 3/14/2012  2:27 PM 
[Vol. 39: 619, 2012] Offsetting Crisis 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
629 
and maximize revenue.48  The speed at which this occurs is related to the 
potential revenue at stake, which in a carbon market would be significant.49 
Some see inherent disadvantages in the cap-and-trade system as well.  It 
is undeniable that firms that carry out such trades will profit.  It is also 
possible, as argued by noted environmentalists such as James Hansen, that a 
cap-and-trade system allows giveaways and advantages to be more easily 
hidden, which in turn may increase the vested interest in such a system and 
particular stakeholders providing political will for passage.50  But even those 
with no vested interest in cap-and-trade have supported it as the most 
efficient system for reducing greenhouse gases.51 
The truth is that the best or most efficient ways to technologically 
reduce greenhouse gases, or which alternative to fossil fuels will prove to be 
the cheapest remains unknown, and this is a powerful argument for market 
forces, rather than direct government control.  As noted by Carol Rose in her 
seminal article on environmental policy implementation devices, market 
systems are best when the costs of the problem are large and flexibility is 
needed to produce the savings to control the problem.52 
Thus, market forces seem to be the best option for control, and for the 
reasons discussed above,53 cap-and-trade appears to have the lead to be the 
primary market solution.  The bottom line is that a cap-and-trade system 
seem to be the most likely avenue for regulating greenhouse gases.  This will 
create a new commodity and will require addressing the regulation of that 
commodity market. 
III.  TOXIC ASSETS AND GREENHOUSE GAS CAP-AND-TRADE 
A.  The Financial Crisis of 2009 and the Role of Toxic Assets 
It may be impossible to pinpoint the “cause” of the Great Recession of 
2008–2010, but mistaken assumptions about commodity prices are certainly 
 
 48.  Deborah L. Paul, The Sources of Tax Complexity: How Much Simplicity Can Fundamental 
Tax Reform Achieve?, 76 N.C. L. REV. 151, 155 (1997). 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  James Hansen, Cap and Fade, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/ 
07/opinion/07hansen.html?_r=1&emc=eta1. 
 51.  See ECON 101: Carbon Tax vs. Cap-and-Trade, ENVTL. ECON., http://www.env-
econ.net/carbon_tax_vs_capandtrade.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2011). 
 52.  See generally Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies 
for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1. 
 53.  See supra notes 42–52 and accompanying text. 
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one cause.54  Particularly for that portion of the crisis where major banks 
were in danger of bankruptcy and there was an extreme pullback in credit, 
the devaluation of assets on the books of companies played a large role.55  
The biggest culprits among these incredible shrinking assets were mortgages 
and mortgage-backed securities.56 
A mortgage is a commodity that represents the right to receive a 
payment over a fixed time at a particular rate.57  This commodity can in turn 
be bundled with other commodities to form a basket of commodities that is 
itself an asset.58  Major equity and trading firms created such vehicles to 
supposedly limit the risks of mortgage default, making these mortgage-
backed securities an extremely popular asset class before the Great 
Recession.59 
Nevertheless, in hindsight the “limited risks” were likely the product of 
a mistaken assumption that the asset underlying a mortgage (the real 
property) would increase in value and thus be fully and overly 
collateralized.60  When prices for real assets dropped, and mortgages were no 
longer backed by adequate value, these assets in turn lost their value.61  
Asset groups that contained these mortgages were also infected, leading 
people to use the term “toxic assets” for these mortgages.62 
B.  Toxic Asset Risks in a Carbon Cap-and-Trade System 
Fear of another asset class similarly infecting the market has led to 
suspicion of cap-and-trade systems.  It is estimated that a carbon cap-and-
trade program will create direct assets of over one trillion dollars in its first 
ten years of existence.63  If these assets in turn become parts of larger assets, 
what risk will exist in the economy as a whole? 
 
 54.  See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, CONCLUSIONS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
COMMISSION, at xxiii–xxiv (2010), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-
reports/fcic_final_report_conclusions.pdf. 
 55.  See id. 
 56.  See id.; Saule T. Omarova, The New Crisis for the New Century: Some Observations on the 
“Big-Picture” Lessons of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 157, 160–61 
(2009). 
 57.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1101–02 (9th ed. 2009). 
 58.  See Andreas Jobst, Back to Basics: What is Securitization?, FIN. & DEV., Sept. 2008, at 48–
49, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2008/09/pdf/basics.pdf. 
 59.  See id.; Robin S. Golden & Sameera Fazili, Raising the Roof: Addressing the Mortgage 
Foreclosure Crisis Through a Collaboration Between City Government and a Law School Clinic, 2 
ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 29, 37–39 (2009). 
 60.  See Jessie S. Lotay, Subprime Carbon: Fashioning an Appropriate Regulatory and 
Legislative Response to the Emerging U.S. Carbon Market to Avoid a Repeat of History in Carbon 
Structured Finance and Derivative Instruments, 32 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 459, 463–69 (2010). 
 61.  See id. 
 62.  See id. 
 63.  See Monast, supra note 25, at 10053–54. 
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Considering that this is an entirely new asset class, the question is an 
important one.  Of course we cannot know everything about the market for 
something that does not yet exist, but if the fear of the assets is based on 
similarities to the assets that were a part of the prior financial crisis, we can 
make comparisons.  This comparison indicates that for the most part, these 
assets are different from the mortgage-backed assets blamed for the prior 
debacle. 
The primary commodity created by the market is the right to emit a 
certain amount of greenhouse gases.  That right will have value, and that 
value will be subject to general market forces.  However, there does not 
appear to be a risk in misconstruing the supporting value of this asset as 
there was with mortgages.  The value is one created by government action 
entirely.  Unless the government required emitters of greenhouse gases to 
surrender the rights to emit, such rights would have no scarcity and thus no 
market or commodity value at all.  What this means is that the “inherent” 
value is thus entirely dependent on government fiat and action.64  The basis 
for a long term cap-and-trade system is that the government establishes the 
rules for the total amount of allocations available at the beginning of the 
system.65  Both the ACES and the Kerry-Boxer bill specified exactly how 
many allocations can exist in any given year, from now through perpetuity.66 
This does not guarantee value of course.  First, in situations of over-
allocation, the government may unilaterally reduce the value of emission 
rights.67  However, such ratcheting is applied evenly so that it does not 
produce disparate advantages in market participants.68  Secondly, 
innovations may affect value.  The point of restricting emissions and making 
the rights to emit scarce over time is to increase the price until such point 
that substitutions, such as non-greenhouse-gas emitting energy, become 
more cost-efficient.  When these substitutions reach a particular level of 
affordability, the emission rights, their competitors in the market, will have 
their value affected by this as well.69 
 
 64.  Daniel D. Barnhizer, Givings Recapture: Funding Public Acquisition of Private Property 
Interests on the Coasts, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 295, 321–22, 321 n.99 (2003) (noting government 
fiat in creating protections for land susceptible to flood produces values similar to “fiat” of backing 
paper money). 
 65.  Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap-and-Trade: Moving Toward 
Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395, 435 (2009). 
 66.  H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 721 (2009); S. 1733, 111th Cong. § 721 (2009). 
 67.  See McAllister, supra note 65, at 414. 
 68.  See id. at 434–35. 
 69.  Cap and Invest: How a Cap-and-Trade Program Can Reduce Energy Costs, Create Jobs, 
and Improve Energy Security, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Apr. 6, 2009), 
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Moreover, comprehensive climate change legislation or even regulation 
could allow other variables, such as banking, borrowing, or price collars to 
exist.70  Banking allows holders of existing rights to emit to “bank” these 
rights for future compliance, while borrowing allows those that need 
emission rights to borrow them from future vintages, usually at a cost.71  
Price collars convert the cost of emissions to a tax at a certain low or high 
price.72  Both ACES73 and Kerry-Boxer allow banking, and limited 
borrowing.74  Since carbon dioxide (CO2) is persistent in the atmosphere for 
long periods, it is thought that borrowing and banking have no impact on 
total emissions over time.  Price collars and other safety valves, and their 
extent, have been discussed, but no hard proposals have been put forth.75  
Though in theory, price collars can actually increase the “hard cap” on 
emissions, if assumptions about demand are correct, this price control 
mechanism can operate predictably. 
What is clear is that when the legislative rules are laid out, the market 
understands this information and risk.  The problem with the mortgage 
backed assets is that the firms that rated them worked under an assumption 
that housing values would continue to rise.76  Here, the information that can 
 
http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/solutions/big_picture_solutions/cap-and-invest.html (“If 
companies find ways to reduce their pollution at a lower cost than the allowances, they can sell any 
surplus allowances to companies that cannot.  The resulting market creates an incentive to 
implement cost-effective cuts in global warming emissions, and encourages investments in new low-
carbon technologies.”). 
 70.  See generally Peter Maniloff & Brian Murray, Allowance Price Containment Options for 
Cap-and-Trade Legislation (Duke  Univ. Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Policy Solutions ed., 2009) 
(examining potential price containment options—including banking, borrowing, and price collars—
for the comprehensive climate change bills being debated by Congress in 2009). 
 71.  See id. 
 72.  See id. 
 73.  H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 725 (2009); see Kristina Lewis & Terence Healy, The Waxman-
Markey Bill and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme: The Basics, MWE.COM (May 22, 2009), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2c08b2e6-aaaa-4dad-bd6c-162714765d8a (“The 
Waxman-Markey Bill proposes that entities may bank allowances and use them to comply with their 
obligations in subsequent years.”); PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, COST 
CONTAINMENT AND OFFSET USE IN THE AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT (WAXMAN-
MARKEY) 2 (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/policymemo6-cost-
containment-offsets-sept2009.pdf  (“The Waxman-Markey proposal allows covered entities to bank 
emission allowances indefinitely for future compliance use.  In addition, the bill includes a two-year 
compliance period as well as unlimited next-year borrowing of allowances with no interest.  
Borrowing of up to 15 percent of an entities’ compliance obligation from a few years into the future 
is also allowed, but at an effective interest rate of 8 percent.”). 
 74.  S. 1733, 111th Cong. § 725 (2009); see PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, AT A 
GLANCE: CLEAN ENERGY JOBS AND AMERICAN POWER ACT  (Oct. 2009), available at 
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/chairmans-mark-kerry-boxer-10-29-09.pdf. 
 75.  See Brian C. Murray et al., Balancing Cost and Emissions Certainty: An Allowance Reserve 
for Cap-and-Trade 8–12 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14258, July 15, 
2008), http://www.nber.org/papers/w14258. 
 76.  See Lotay, supra note 60, at 463–69. 
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affect the price—competitor technologies, energy savings, and 
government-allowed flexibility mechanisms—is understood.  While we do 
not know what the exact reaction of the market will be, we do know that it 
will react.  There is not any one factor that the market seems to have an 
unfounded belief in. 
The biggest unknown may be the action of the government itself.  If the 
government were to suddenly allow more rights to emit than anticipated at 
the time of the creation of the market, that could have an important impact 
on the entire asset class.77  This risk is tempered by the belief that once the 
government establishes the system, it will proceed along the same path—
indeed, this has been the experience in other cap-and-trade systems.78  One 
of the values of a cap-and-trade system is that everyone with an investment 
in the system has an incentive to preserve the rules.79  In such cases, if there 
were later rule changes, they would and should be made with the least 
possible impact on the market. 
To the extent that the program still has uncertainty, such as allowing 
major decisions over supply and demand to be decided later, by regulation 
for instance, this does indicate risk to the market.  However, with the 
important exception of offsets, the legislative provisions in the previously 
proposed laws are quite clear and straightforward, indicating less room for 
major government supply changes.  California’s system is also very specific 
about allocation, and to the extent the EPA introduces such a system, 
regulatory controls should be as specific as possible.80 
C.  The “Toxicity” of Offsets? 
Offsets appear to be the big piece of the system with attributes similar to 
the risky assets at play in the Great Recession.  “Greenhouse gas offsets” are 
commonly described as projects or systems that “offset” greenhouse gas 
emissions by pulling an equivalent amount of greenhouse gas (or sometimes 
 
 77.  See Alexander Savelkoul & Christopher Zink, Opinion: The Price is Right, CARBON 
FINANCE, Mar. 4, 2009, http://www.carbon-financeonline.com/index.cfm?section=features& 
action=view&id=11893 (“[T]he mere hint of government intervention in the market has the potential 
to severely distort it.”). 
 78.  See McAllister, supra note 65, at 398–410. 
 79.  Jeanette M. Soares, Solving the Super Wicked Problem of Climate Change: How Restraining 
the Present Could Aid in Establishing an Emissions Cap and Designing Allowance Auctions, 40 
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10763, 10764 (2010). 
 80.  Id. at 10763 (noting how regulatory actions should be controlled ahead of time). 
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warming potential) from the atmospheric system.81  In general, offsets must 
be “permanent” and “additional” to business as usual in order to be an actual 
setoff to produced greenhouse gases.82  While offsets are theoretically 
neutral with respect to their impacts for reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
compared with the surrender of allocations, the market effects are different. 
First, unlimited offsets could imply that we may never reach a supply 
constriction of emission allocations, which makes creating a market in such 
allocations very difficult.83  Nevertheless, this can be managed by capping 
how much compliance can be met with offsets.  All of the major proposed 
cap-and-trade bills of the last several years specified offset limitations, 
generally at no more than 25%.84  In situations where the total amount of 
offsets is capped, it can be assumed that given the differentiation in prices 
for offsets and a limited market cap, one can predict that eventually the 
maximum amount of offsets will be reached.85 
Another potential uncertainty with offsets is exactly how they will be 
defined.  While the total supply of offsets was capped in the proposed 
federal laws,86 the qualification procedure was less specified, with both 
major bills allowing agency regulation to fully make this determination.87  
The Kerry-Boxer proposal tried to lessen this impact by specifying some 
likely offset categories in the legislation itself,88 thus lessening possible 
volatility.  While this can be problematic, in some ways it is less uncertain 
than the current situation that exists in the voluntary offsets market, where 
there are multiple ways to make a determination currently in use.89  By 
 
 81.  Robert J. Carpenter, Implementation of Biological Sequestration Offsets in a Carbon 
Reduction Policy: Answers to Key Questions for a Successful Domestic Offset Program, 31 ENERGY 
L.J. 157, 165 (2010). 
 82.  See id. at 165–66. 
 83.  Though many experts doubt that enough offsets would be available to fail in constriction at 
the beginning of the market.  See Maniloff & Murray, supra note 70, at 125. 
 84.  See LARRY PARKER & BRENT D. YACOBUCCI, GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION: CAP-AND-
TRADE BILLS IN THE 100TH CONGRESS, at app. A (2007), available at http://fpc.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/94861.pdf (comparing “key provisions” of proposed greenhouse gas 
reduction bills). 
 85.  In California, businesses have pushed for unlimited offsets recognizing the market 
differential between the likely costs of offsets and cost of rights to emit.  See Debra Kahn, Interest 
Groups Push for Unlimited Offsets in Western Market, CLIMATEWIRE (July 29, 2008), 
http://www.offsetqualityinitiative.org/pdfs/ClimateWireStory_7_08.pdf. 
 86.  See, e.g., H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 722(d)(1)(A) (2009) (capping offsets at two billion 
tons); see also PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, PEW CENTER SUMMARY OF H.R. 2454: 
AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009 (WAXMAN-MARKEY) 47–49 (2009), 
available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Waxman-Markey%20summary_FINAL_ 
7.31.pdf (summarizing the relevant provisions in ACES). 
 87.  H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 722 (2009); S. 1733, 111th Cong. § 722 (2009). 
 88.  H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 722 (2009); S. 1733, 111th Cong. § 722 (2009). 
 89.  See MOLLY PETERS-STANLEY ET AL., BACK TO THE FUTURE: STATE OF VOLUNTARY 
CARBON MARKETS 2001, at 55–59 annex. A.1–2 (2011), available at http://www.forest-trends.org/~ 
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moving offset certification and thus offset value to one certifier, this limits 
some uncertainty since whatever the rules are, there will be only one set of 
clear rules on offsets approvals.90 
The more uncontrollable issue concerning offsets and the market is that 
offsets are assets that in turn could be based on an underlying asset—the 
amount of greenhouse gas permanently avoided that would not have 
occurred otherwise.  If the offset asset is linked to the performance of the 
offset project, that can create a significant risk of market nonperformance.91  
This alone does not mean that a market could not handle such information.  
In general, the risk of offset underperformance, while variable, would not 
necessarily suffer from market-wide misunderstanding, just as historically, 
market underperformance by loans and mortgages were generally 
understood by the market.  It is only a problem when there is no correct 
information to be relied upon.  Since we do have current examples of offset 
projects, and estimates about how well they sequester carbon, and 
knowledge of how and whether they are “permanent,” this risk can be 
controlled.92 
The bigger issue is how offset project underperformance will be defined 
in terms of market value by a government entity.  While government 
regulation can support the market by being clear in definitions, it can also 
undermine the market if it is not clear about how and whether its 
government-controlled approval of “valuing” of the offset can be affected 
after general offset approval. 
Again, since offsets have no inherent value, they are valuable to the 
extent the certifying authority states that they are.  If this value is determined 
at one point, and in such a way that eventually the rules are understood by 
the market, then this uncertainty is manageable.  If the value can be revisited 
with less certain principles, the market becomes more difficult.  For 
example, the government could specify that an offset value changes based 
on the underlying success at sequestering or removing carbon, but if the 
 
foresttr/publication_details.php?publicationID=2828 (enumerating and describing various “Market 
Standards and Certification Programs” currently operating within voluntary carbon markets). 
 90.  Maria Savasta-Kennedy, The Newest Hybrid: Notes Toward Standardized Certification of 
Carbon Offsets, 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 851, 857 (2009) (noting that government 
regulation can “standardize” offset definitions). 
 91.  See id. at 867 (“The lack of a consistent certification standard undermines the integrity of 
offsets, both in terms of the current voluntary offset market and future regulatory markets the United 
States may join.”). 
 92.  See Cecelia Del Cid-Liccardi & Timothy Kramer, Managing Carbon Sequestration in 
Tropical Forests, in FOREST AND CARBON: A SYNTHESIS OF SCIENCE, MANAGEMENT, AND POLICY 
FOR CARBON SEQUESTRATION IN FORESTS 255, 255–79 (Mary L. Tyrrell et al. eds., 2009). 
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offset did not lose its value in direct proportion to the underperformance of 
the project, it would be difficult for a market to understand.  Since the offset 
value is in turn solely based on government fiat, this creates a difficulty that 
“hard” assets do not create. 
IV.  OFFSETS, MARKET PERFORMANCE, AND                              
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 
Offset nonperformance can be understood on two distinct axes.  There 
could be nonperformance or underperformance on environmental goals (e.g., 
there was not an offset of greenhouse gases as predicted);93 or there could be 
nonperformance or underperformance in the market context (e.g., the offset 
certificate is not worth what was expected or promised because the 
underlying asset’s value has eroded).  Obviously, with no additional 
restrictions, these would be related.  For example, if an offset failed to 
reduce greenhouse gases as much as projected or predicted, and its value 
was based on that, then an underperformance in the environmental realm 
would also mean an underperformance or performance failure in the market 
context.  But of course, these two factors can be separated by law.  For 
instance, one could have conditions precedent for qualifying an offset for the 
market such that when those conditions are met, it “receives” market value 
from the government program, whether or not it performs as guaranteed in 
the environmental context. 
The current offset market created by the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), segregates the CDM market value from 
future offset reversals.94  Since these credits are then recognized in the EU 
trading market,95 also without relation to any forthcoming actual 
environmental performance, the market is insulated from the failure of the 
underlying asset. 
While this may protect the market from shocks, it opens up the 
possibility that the environmental goals promised will go unrealized, and this 
of course would undermine the whole purpose of the system.  Offsets have 
come under scathing criticism for just this problem.96  In his analysis of the 
 
 93.  See Christopher S. Galik & Robert B. Jackson, Risks to Forest Carbon Offset Projects in a 
Changing Climate, 257 FOREST ECOLOGY & MGMT. 2209, 2210 (2009). 
 94.  See Offset Quality Initiative, Assessing Offset Quality in the Clean Development 
Mechanism, 10 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 25, 30–31 (2010). 
 95.  See Judson Jaffe et al., Linking Tradable Permit Systems: A Key Element of Emerging 
International Climate Policy Architecture, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 789, 798–99 (2009). 
 96.  Robert H. Frank, Carbon Offsets: A Small Price to Pay for Efficiency, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/31/business/31view.html. 
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CDM program, Michael Wara notes that many of the CDM offsets did not 
do what they promised.97 
Moreover, the failure to control greenhouse gases as promised can occur 
in many realms.  In biological sequestration, the biological process may not 
work as planned, or there could be accidental or intentional reversals, 
wherein sequestered CO2 is re-released into the atmosphere.98  Moreover, 
any offset may prove over time to not have been additional, or to not be 
permanent.99  Proper procedures in the certifying government body can and 
should be designed to minimize these possibilities, but it is true that when 
the market risk is separated from the environmental risk, one removes an 
important private market investigatory function, leaving environmental 
vetting and verification entirely to the certifying agency.  After all, if your 
offset certificate retains its value even if the underlying offset reverses or 
does not meet an offset criteria, this may make no difference to a market 
participant. 
On the other hand, if offset values can disappear based on government 
reversal of value in a way that cannot be understood or predicted, this 
increases the risk of the introduction of a toxic underlying asset in the 
marketplace.100  Just as mortgage-backed securities lost their value and 
derivatives based on them waivered, a sudden reversal of an entire offset 
value could infect derivatives based on these as well. 
Thus, while government protection of the greenhouse gas reduction 
effects of offsets is critical, how it accomplishes this is very important for 
purposes of a functioning market.  An unfettered government discretionary 
action might discourage anyone from purchasing or using the offsets as they 
do not have any tools to assess or understand value going forward. 
This seeming tradeoff, between either protecting the market from 
infection or protecting the environmental reductions at all costs, leads many 
to call for the elimination of offsets altogether.101  After all, if they cannot be 
used as substitutes for actual source reductions, they cannot be an 
 
 97.  Michael Wara, Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism’s Performance and Potential, 
55 UCLA L. REV. 1759, 1764 (2008) (“The CDM is failing as a market because its rules, rather than 
producing real reductions, have accounting loopholes that allow participants to manufacture 
[greenhouse gas] credits at little or no cost beyond the payment of consultants necessary to surmount 
the necessary regulatory hurdles.”). 
 98.  See Carpenter, supra note 81, at 171. 
 99.  Id. at 166–72. 
 100.  See STEVE SUPPAN, SPECULATING ON CARBON: THE NEXT TOXIC ASSET 6–7 (2009), 
available at http://www.iatp.org/files/2009_11_30_SpeculatingOnCarbon-SS_web.pdf (arguing that 
price volatility could make carbon “the next toxic asset investment”). 
 101.  See CHAN, supra note 19, at 8. 
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environmental or market problem.  However, those that have studied cap-
and-trade recognize offsets to be some of the most efficient ways to reduce 
greenhouse gases.102  As noted by Brian Murray and Aaron Jenkins: 
Perhaps the most compelling case for offsets use is that it can 
increase the cost-effectiveness of a compliance-based cap-and-trade 
system.  By providing inexpensive mitigation, especially at the 
beginning of a new mandatory [greenhouse gas] system, offsets 
could help to lower the overall cost of reaching the abatement level 
set by the policy cap.103 
As such, offsets help us reach the environmental goal with less expense, 
and since they can be available quickly, they provide a way for a cap-and-
trade market to initially function.104  They can also function as a market 
relief valve, providing ways for emitters to get permits if the price of the 
right to emit goes up too quickly and unpredictably.105  Moreover, by 
helping reduce other pollutants or enhancing other environmental values, 
such as habitat, offsets can provide additional benefits.106 
V.  TAILORING LEGISLATION TO AVOID ENVIRONMENTAL  
AND MARKET RISK 
The risks in offsets can be divided into risks from fraud and risks from 
the structure of the system itself.  While fraud can be a serious issue and has 
already affected the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme,107 it is 
 
 102.  See Brian C. Murray & W. Aaron Jenkins, Designing Cap and Trade to Account for 
“Imperfect” Offsets 1 (Duke Univ. Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Policy Solutions, Working Paper EE 10-
03, Sept. 2010), available at http://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/environmentaleconomics/designing-
cap-and-trade-imperfect-offsets (“The use of offsets can potentially improve a cap-and-trade system 
by lowering the overall cost of compliance, encourage mitigation from outside of the cap, and 
function as a bridge strategy, giving the regulated sectors time to innovate new low-carbon 
technologies and business plans.”); see also Frank, supra note 96. 
 103.  Murray & Jenkins, supra note 102, at 3. 
 104.  ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE & BUS. FOR SOC. RESPONSIBILITY, OFFSETTING EMISSIONS: A 
BUSINESS BRIEF ON THE VOLUNTARY CARBON MARKET 2 (2d ed. Feb. 2008), available at 
http://www.bsr.org/reports/BSR_Voluntary-Carbon-Offsets-2.pdf. 
 105.  See Murray & Jenkins, supra note 102, at 5–6 (describing the “welfare gains from offset 
trade”). 
 106.  Of course offsets can also cause additional social and environmental harm.  Controlling for 
these risks and benefits may be another aspect of offsets that can be considered by the verifying 
agency.  Both the Waxman-Markey and the Kerry-Boxer bills recognize these as legitimate factors 
in offset approval. See H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 722 (2009); S. 1733, 111th Cong. § 722 (2009).  
And California’s AB 32 has a major focus on offset co-harms and benefits.  See AB 32, supra note 
10. 
 107.  See Will Bierbower, A Brief History of Fraudulent Activity on the EU-ETS, WORLDWATCH 
INST. (Feb. 25, 2011), http://blogs.worldwatch.org/revolt/a-brief-history-of-fraudulent-activity-on-
the-eu-ets-2/; Nathanial Gronewold, Europe’s Carbon Emissions Trading—Growing Pains or 
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little different from preventing fraud in any market system.  For instance, 
because the EU does not have taxes on inter-country purchasing, but does 
have it within countries, fraudsters tried to defraud the Denmark tax 
authorities.108  This was discovered, however, and can be addressed by 
increased enforcement.  Similarly, bribes can be addressed as they are 
addressed in other contexts.109 
Reporting schemes can also be problematic.  In her Ten Ways to Game 
the Carbon Market, Michelle Chan of Friends of the Earth focuses on 
problems in reporting baselines—inflating how much carbon is sequestered 
or reducing how much is produced—and also the potential for 
misrepresenting information about whether or not an offset is real, which is 
necessary to meet the requirements for an offset to be an actual “additional, 
permanent” reduction from business as usual.110  In general, these concerns 
are best addressed by not allowing self-reporting and having strong 
monitoring and evaluation at the front end of certification of carbon credits 
or offsets.111  But it is true that if this is not addressed, these are the kind of 
issues that could infect the market (by value being stripped from government 
action) or alternatively, not infect the market but misstate the actual 
greenhouse reductions that were reported. 
Thus, the trillion dollar question for a regulatory cap-and-trade system is 
the one proposed in the Introduction: how does one ensure that real 
reductions actually happen from offsets in a system, and also ensure that the 
market does not face a substantial risk of failure that can infect other 
financial instruments? 
The ACES and the Kerry-Boxer bill authorize the EPA Administrator to 
determine which mechanisms to employ to ensure offset integrity and also 
specify two major propositions for controlling the risks associated with 
 
Wholesale Theft?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2011/01/31/31 
climatewire-europes-carbon-emissions-trading-growing-pai-74999.html?pagewanted=all. 
 108.  The Carbon Carousel: VAT Tax Fraud, CORPORATE WATCH (July 22, 2010), 
http://www.corporatewatch.org/?lid=3676. 
 109.  We do not think of bribery as a large issue in the developed world but it can have significant 
consequences in the developing world.  Since many offsets may be allowed from the developing 
world in a U.S. system, such a problem must be considered.  See Phishing, Bribery and 
Falsification: Combating the Complexities of Carbon Fraud, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (June 9, 
2010), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2521. 
 110.  See CHAN, supra note 19, at 2–3. 
 111.  See Thomas P. Healy, Clearing the Air: Pursuing a Course to Define the Federal 
Government’s Role in the Voluntary Carbon Offset Market, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 871, 882 (2009) 
(arguing that challenges to the carbon offset market’s credibility can be improved by increased 
regulation). 
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offset qualification: insurance provisions and a reserve bank.112  The 
provisions from ACES are reviewed in an earlier research paper from 
CLEAR.113 
ACES would have required the Administrator to “prescribe mechanisms 
to ensure that any sequestration with respect to which an offset credit 
[corresponds] . . . results in a permanent net increase in sequestration.”114  
ACES “specifically lists an offset reserve mechanism (combined with 
reversal penalties) and an insurance mechanism as two possibilities” to 
avoid offset problems.115  “The bill’s suggested offsets reserve mechanism 
establishes a pool of offset credits . . . from which credits are retired in the 
event of a reversal episode at an amount sufficient ‘to fully account for the 
tons of carbon dioxide equivalent’ released.”116  The goal is to ensure that 
the actual greenhouse gas reduction matches the amount promised in the 
initial offset.117 
To build and preserve this offset reserve, offset projects must 
compensate for reversal risks by paying a “reversal premium” in the form of 
discounted value.118  This can be based on specific project’s known reversal 
risks, but can also be more arbitrary.119  As a result, the offset approver may 
issue “fewer credits to an offset project than it has actually sequestered” in 
many cases.120 
Additionally, ACES requires offset project developers “to pay a reversal 
penalty to help replenish the offset reserve” when a reversal occurs.121  If the 
reversal is intentional, the “offset project developer must place credits or 
allowances into the reserve ‘equal in number to the number of reserve offset 
credits that were canceled due to the reversal.’”122  If the reversal is 
unintentional, the project developer must place the lesser of “half the 
number of credits canceled due to the reversal or half the number of credits 
already placed into the reserve for that project, whichever is less.”123 
 
 112.  H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 734 (2009). 
 113.  See Ken Allinson et al., International Avoided Deforestation Offset Projects: Insuring the 
Risk of Reversal Penalties (Ctr. for Law, Env’t, Adaptation & Res., May 2010), available at 
http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/clear/adoffsetreversalpenaltyinsurance.pdf. 
 114.  Id. at 8 (citing H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 734(b)(2) (2009)). 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. (quoting H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 734(b)(3)(B)(i) (2009)). 
 117.  See id. 
 118.  See id. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. (citing H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 734(b)(3)(A) (2009)). 
 121.  See id. (citing H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 734(b)(3)(B) (2009)). 
 122.  Id. at 8–9 (quoting H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 734(b)(3)(B)(ii) (2009)). 
 123.  Id. at 9.  Here is an example to illustrate this provision: 
[C]onsider a hypothetical project that offsets one-hundred tons of carbon dioxide 
(“CO2”) in one vintage year.  Under ACES, if the Administrator applied a twenty percent 
discount, it would issue the project developer eighty offset credits and place twenty 
DO NOT DELETE 3/14/2012  2:27 PM 
[Vol. 39: 619, 2012] Offsetting Crisis 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
641 
The reversal penalty is the “key to maintaining environmental integrity” 
in the ACES offset program.124  Without replenishment, the reserve pool 
would be depleted, and the Administrator “would not be able to retire offset 
credits equal to the amount of CO2 released in a reversal.”125  “Such a 
scenario would create a gap between AD offset credits on the market and the 
putative corresponding amount of tons sequestered.”126  The offset reserve 
mechanism ensures that the amount of offset credits introduced into the 
market never exceeds the amount of CO2 the offset project is actually 
supposed to sequester and thus protects environmental integrity.127 
ACES alternatively suggests an insurance mechanism to ensure 
environmental integrity.  This would provide “for purchase and provision to 
the Administrator for retirement of an amount of offset credits or emission 
allowances equal . . . to the tons of carbon dioxide equivalents of greenhouse 
gas emissions released due to reversal.”128  ACES would leave the form of 
insurance to the Administrator’s discretion129 but there are prior examples of 
situations in which insurance requirements have been used to ensure 
environmental integrity.130  Both the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
 
credits into the offset reserve at the end of the vintage year.  Now assume that this project 
experiences an unintentional reversal (e.g., a forest fire initiated by lightening) releasing 
forty tons of sequestered CO2.  Under ACES, at the time of reversal, the Administrator 
would retire a quantity of offset credits equivalent to forty tons of CO2 from the offset 
reserve to account for the credits lost due to the unintentional reversal.  The 
Administrator would then require the project developer to place ten offset credits into the 
reserve (half the number already reserved for that project), rather than twenty credits (half 
the number of credits retired by the Administrator). 
Id. at 9 n.31. 
 124.  Id. at 9. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. (citing H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 734(b)(2) (2009)) (charging the Administrator to 
“prescribe mechanisms to ensure that any sequestration with respect to which an offset credit is 
issued . . . results in a permanent net increase in sequestration, and that full account is taken of any 
actual or potential reversal of such sequestration”). 
 128.  Id. (citing H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 734(b)(2)(B) (2009)). 
 129.  See  H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 734(b)(2) (2009) (instructing the Administrator to create “at 
least one” mechanism designed to ensure that all sequestration for which offset credit is issued 
actually “result[s] in a permanent net increase in sequestration”—including an offsets reserve or an 
insurance provision). 
 130.  See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2006); see also 
EPA Standards for Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal 
Facilities Rule, 40 C.F.R. § 264.147 (2011) (implementing the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act by requiring “[a]n owner or operator of a hazardous waste treatment, storage, or disposal facility 
[to] . . . demonstrate financial responsibility for bodily injury and property damage to third parties 
caused by sudden accidental occurrences arising from operations of the facility”); Jeffrey Kehne, 
Encouraging Safety Through Insurance-Based Incentives: Financial Responsibility for Hazardous 
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Act and the Underground Storage Tank provisions of the Solid Waste 
Disposal Act require that those handling potentially environmentally 
harmful products maintain insurance or bonding sufficient to ensure that any 
damage from an accident could be corrected.131  Such provisions could be 
applied in an offset context as well, since sequestration would be a product 
on the market that could be purchased to provide for offsetting unexpected 
greenhouse gas release harms. 
Since these proposals for reversal require that reversal risks are borne by 
the offset project developer, these proposals would generally not cause any 
reduction in the value of the offset once it has been certified.  In this sense, it 
would be similar to the CDM mechanism wherein offsets retain market 
value once they have been approved.  This avoids situations in which the 
manner of government accountability for reversals is unknown and thus 
would eliminate unexpected “toxicity” in offset asset classes.  Moreover, 
unlike the situation with the CDM, both of these mechanisms provide 
legitimate ways for the greenhouse-gas-reducing integrity to be preserved. 
The reserve requirement in particular is well drafted.  Risks of loss are 
factored in at the beginning based on actuarial data, and intentional reversals 
provide for additional penalties, all of which shore up the reserve necessary 
to preserve the greenhouse gas reductions.132  The insurance provision is less 
certain to address actual losses since it is unknown how such insurance 
would be capitalized or operationalized, but as noted above, such programs 
can work.133 
Unfortunately, the bills do not stop there in accounting for offset 
reversals.  In the ACES and Kerry-Boxer proposals, there is one key 
sentence that allows the Administrator of the offset system to make “any 
other provisions the Administrator determines necessary” to ensure the 
environmental benefits of carbon reduction if there is a problem with 
offsets.134  While one sentence may seem innocuous in a bill that runs to 
hundreds of pages, this language is particularly problematic for the risk of 
introducing toxic assets in a cap-and-trade system.  It is uncertain what this 
provision would have looked like in practice, but it seems to have been 
designed to allow the offset administering agency to do anything necessary 
to preserve the environmental value of an offset.  While laudable from an 
environmental perspective, this could introduce massive uncertainty into a 
 
Wastes, 96 YALE L.J. 403, 416–17 (1986) (noting that RCRA regulations require hazardous waste 
facilities to carry liability coverage). 
 131.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991b, 6991b(d)(1) (2006). 
 132.  See H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §§ 734(b)(3), 734(b)(3)(B)(ii) (2009). 
 133.  Of course there is a possibility that insurance markets themselves can fail as was seen in the 
recent financial crisis, and the risks of systemic failure of the whole system would need to be 
examined before deciding solely on an insurance provision for safeguard. 
 134.  H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 734 (2009). 
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market.  Any offset, in anyone’s hands, could have its value reduced to zero 
at any time, and in unpredictable ways.  Assets based on such offsets, such 
as derivatives, would in turn see their values reduced in completely 
unknowable amounts. 
In one sense, such a provision recalls the government’s unfettered power 
under Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA) clean-ups, when the government and other parties 
could go after anyone seeking up to full liability.135  The response in that 
situation was avoidance of the system entirely, which could be expected here 
as well, removing any benefits of offsets from a cap-and-trade market.136 
What then is the lesson from regulation of offsets in a cap-and-trade 
market?  In order to preserve both environmental and market integrity, the 
needle must be threaded carefully.  Some provision must be made to ensure 
that underperforming offsets are made whole or accounted for so that all 
expected greenhouse gas reduction occurs.137  But this provision should be 
structured in a way to throw the risk of loss on a predictable target rather 
than on the offset asset itself.  The most likely provision would put the risk 
of loss on the offset developer, who is the one who creates and profits from 
the offset originally. 
Such a risk of loss aligns incentives to prod the developers to be careful 
and honest in offset development.  Of course, there must be some way to 
ensure that offset developers can make sub-performing offsets whole.  Both 
a carefully structured insurance mechanism and an even more creative 
reserve mechanism would do this.138  If the reversal percentages are 
calculated correctly, the offset reserve should be entirely sufficient to handle 
offset failures. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
While there could be problems with a cap-and-trade system to control 
greenhouse gases, the risk of financial ruin from toxic assets need not be one 
of them.  Assuming we are in an inexorable march towards cap-and-trade 
with linked systems both domestically and internationally, it is important to 
 
 135.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606, 9607 (2006). 
 136.  See Alfred R. Light, Restatement for Joint and Several Liability Under CERCLA After 
Burlington Northern, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11058, 11058 (2009) (noting that, under 
Burlington, a party can avoid CERCLA liability by demonstrating that a “reasonable basis . . . exists 
to limit the extent of his liability”). 
 137.  See H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 734(b)(2) (2009). 
 138.  See H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 734(b)(2) (2009). 
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understand this simple fact.139  It is not that a huge new market with exotic 
financial instruments could not pose risk, it is that we can understand where 
such a risk comes from, and have effective ways of countering such risk.140 
In the carbon market scenario, this requires a focus on offsets.  Offset 
programs can be designed to ensure that they do the environmental job of 
actually reducing or sequestering greenhouse gases while also ensuring that 
reversals and underperformance do not create toxic assets.  Because the 
government controls the value, it can define how an offset will be valued 
and then ensure that the value will be retained in a market.  It then ensures 
environmental integrity by creating mechanisms which ensure that all losses 
can be covered by a particular participant, in this case the offset developer. 
Given the criticism that the ACES proposal’s great complexity was its 
problem,141 it is ironic that the examples of the more complex provisions in 
these bills, such as reserve mechanisms, are more likely to ensure both 
environmental and market stability than the simple general regulatory 
authority provisions.  The specific provisions in the bills can work and 
unfettered government discretion could create market dangers.142  Wherever 
cap-and-trade systems are adopted, be they statutory or regulatory, if we can 
tailor the offset provisions in a manner to account for losses in a particular 
way as outlined in the statutory proposals, we can have our environmental 
cake and the market too. 
 
 
 139.  See supra Part II. 
 140.  See supra Part V. 
 141.  Senate Offers Some Hope for Legislation to Combat Climate Change, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 
2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/09/AR2010020903526.html. 
 142.  See supra Part V. 
